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War, Peace, and "the
System": Three Perspectives
PAUL ADAMS
The University of Iowa
Social workers have sometimes seen war as part of a larger system and
as linked to other forms of violence or social evil. This article considers
three kinds of analysis which identify different systems (capitalism, pa-
triarchy, and exterminism), see the links in different ways, and lead to
different practical conclusions. Each perspective is examined in terms of
its capacity to explain the phenomena it describes and to identify a social
change strategy that can eliminate them. It is suggested that social work-
ers may be professionally predisposed to select among these perspectives
for reasons other than their explanatory power or strategic utility.
One of social work's claims to professional distinctiveness,
as compared with other therapeutic occupations, is its concern
with the links between private troubles and public issues, be-
tween person and environment, or between different system
levels. Professionally concerned with the private violence of
family life as well as with the institutionalized violence that is
reflected in differential infant mortality rates and life expectan-
des, social workers have sometimes turned their attention to
questions of war and peace. From Jane Addams to the Social
Workers for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Committee of the
National Association of Social Workers, they have brought their
professional experience and way of looking at the world to bear
on this vital question of public policy.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find the chair of the afore-
mentioned committee, Dorothy Van Soest (1988, p. 4), challeng-
ing her colleagues to "make the connections between public and
private violence and between peace and social justice." "Of ne-
cessity," she argues, "this involves self-assessment in relation to
our own contributions to violence and to injustice. This means
examining social work structures, paradigms, and processes to
determine where they might contain and maintain the roots of
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inequality and, therefore, violence." In what follows both as-
pects of this challenge are taken up. In the first place, three
ways of making the connections between war and other forms
of violence or social evil are examined in terms of their capac-
ity to explain the phenomena they describe and to identify an
effective social change strategy. Secondly, a sub-theme is de-
veloped concerning the ways in which professional ideology
may predispose social workers to select among these perspec-
tives for reasons other than their explanatory power or strategic
utility.
To put the question simply, if war is art of a violent sys-
tem and linked to other forms of violence, what is the system
and how is war linked to it? Among those who accept the as-
sumption that war and violence are intrinsic to the system, at
least three different systems have been identified-capitalism,
patriarchy, and exterminism. In discussing these as three broad
approaches there is a danger of amalgamating distinct positions
and losing some shades and subtleties of argument within each,
as well as of failing to do justice to attempts to combine dif-
ferent approaches, such as "socialist feminism". 1 Nevertheless,
by presenting the positions in their strongest forms, we may
bring most sharply into focus their respective assumptions and
strategic implications.
In view of the short trajectory and lack of demonstrable suc-
cess of most large peace movements, the question of how we
identify the system that gives rise to war and how we seek to
modify or transform it assumes considerable practical impor-
tance. Different answers to this question also imply different
assessments of the prospects for the present reduction in mili-
tary conflicts and tensions, and indeed for any lasting peace on
the basis of existing economic and political arrangements. The
issue also has implications, as Van Soest's challenge suggests,
for every area of social work practice and theory.
The most recent wave of the peace movement, that of the
early 1980s, arose in a context of massive increases in arms
spending and a rising level of political conflict between the su-
perpowers. It had already ebbed well before the present reduc-
tion of tensions and cuts in planned military spending, which
in turn evaporated most of what remained of the movement.
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By reflecting upon the analyses and strategies that came to the
fore in the early 1980s, we may take advantage of the present
interlude in the hope of ensuring that the next movement can
learn from the last.
All three perspectives discussed here offer ways of looking
at and responding to the threat of nuclear annihilation, which
was the primary concern of the last anti-war movement. Since
the question of whether there can be a useful theory of war-in-
general is a point at issue, the present article will focus primarily
on the main wars of the twentieth century and on the threat of
global nuclear war, leaving aside wars of earlier periods and
their links to earlier systems.
Capitalism
The classic account of modem war as part of a larger system
and as linked to other forms of social evil is that developed
by marxism, primarily in the period before and during World
War I. This is the most rigorous and sophisticated analysis, the
product of some of the greatest minds (and fighters for social
change) of their period. The more recent accounts discussed
here represent in part reactions to, or efforts to improve upon,
their work.
The task of clarifying the relationship between war and "the
system" became especially urgent after the main socialist parties
abandoned their internationalist principles upon the outbreak
of the First World War. Those who had more or less explic-
itly rejected a revolutionary perspective, and who looked for
a gradual and peaceful transition to socialism through parlia-
ment, provided an essential prop to their national war machines.
These advocates of peaceful change supported and facilitated
the mobilization of millions of workers for the defense of their
national state, and for their mutual slaughter on the battlefields
of Europe.
The gulf between reformism and classical marxism only be-
came fully apparent with the outbreak of war and the collapse
of the Second International (Kirby, 1986; Schorske, 1955). The
revolutionary minority, who opposed their own states and their
war machines, were faced with the challenge of reconstructing a
scientific theory that explained the relation between capitalism
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and war, and that showed the links between the struggle against
the state and opposition to militarism. This resulted in both a
brilliant series of polemics by Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, and
others on the socialist attitude to war, and in an important de-
velopment of the theory of imperialism, above all by Bukharin
and Lenin (Riddell, 1986; Bukharin, 1972; Lenin, 1964).
In their studies of imperialism, Lenin and Bukharin showed
that, as capitalism had developed into an integrated world econ-
omy, the forms of competition had changed. As capital became
concentrated in larger blocks, and centralized in fewer, the state
and economy tended to fuse. Competition occurred increasingly
between whole national economies, was organized by the state,
and increasingly took nonprice, and nonmarket forms, includ-
ing those of diplomacy and war. For example, as German capital
expanded, it not only came up against British firms in its search
for markets and raw materials, but also confronted tariffs and
trade barriers erected and defended by the British state and
its armed forces. States, like firms, were locked into a global
system of competition from which they could not escape and
which operated independently of their will. "The anarchy of
world capitalism," as Bukharin put it (1979, p. 66), ". . .is ex-
pressed in the clash between state organizations of capital, in
capitalist wars."
Both Lenin and Bukharin were concerned to refute the argu-
ment advanced by the leading German socialist, Karl Kautsky,
that the war was not an expression of the logic of capitalist com-
petition in the period of imperialism, but a mistake (Kautsky,
1970). It was quite possible, in Kautsky's view, for the leading
imperialist powers to arrive at a position of peaceful coexis-
tence, or "ultra-imperialism," in which they agreed to exploit
the colonies cooperatively. Militarism could thus be detached
from capitalism and ended, even while the economic system
continued.
For Lenin and Bukharin, on the contrary, such an arrange-
ment could not for long survive the pressures of competition.
Any given partition of the world could only be temporary, be-
cause different national economies grew at different rates, and
a large disproportion between economic and political power
would lead to demands for a larger share of the world to go to
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the later but more rapidly developing powers. Periods of peace,
Lenin (1964, p. 295) argued, "are inevitably nothing more than a
'truce' in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the
ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars." This did
not mean that every military conflict could be reduced directly
to the economic interests of the protagonists. Military competi-
tion had a logic of its own, so that strategic considerations-the
military or political importance of a territory to a rival, for
instance-could lead to war even when no immediate economic
advantage was at stake. The requirements of military compet-
itiveness, furthermore, imposed demands on the economy, in
particular for a heavy industrial base and for the technology
that could support a sophisticated war machine. Lenin's and
Bukharin's argument was, rather, that capitalism in its latest,
imperialist phase was organically linked to war. Wars, both
between the imperial powers for the division and redivision
of the world, and between subject peoples and their colonial
oppressors, were inscribed in the very logic of the capitalist
system.
Two very important political conclusions followed from this
analysis. the first was that the achievement of peace was inex-
tricably linked to the struggle for socialism. The links that had
to be made were to the everyday struggles in which workers
confronted their employers or the state. Linking these struggles
with the fight against every form of national, racial, and sexual
oppression required, as the most consistently anti-war socialists
came to see, a break with earlier forms of organization. As Chris
Harman (1980, p. 22) has put it,
Until 1914 opposition to the different aspects of capitalist
society tended to flow into different channels. There was a
trade unionism that was concerned chiefly (when it even did
that) with the wage rates and working conditions of workers
with particular skills. There was a 'political' socialism that
only concerned itself with making propaganda and collect-
ing votes. There was a pacifism that only made ineffectual
protests against participation in wars. There was a feminism
which restricted itself to fighting the legal disabilities facing
women.
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None of these "movements" withstood the test of war. Not
only were they unable to stop it. They typically suspended their
struggles for the duration or even supported the war effort.
What international socialists learned from the Russian Rev-
olution was the need to create a new kind of party, one that
was rooted in the workplaces and in the day-to-day struggles
of workers, but also one that would go beyond workplace is-
sues. Such a party "would educate, agitate, organise within each
of these wider movements for the connections to be made, for
the strikes against food shortages to become strikes against the
militarists, for the demonstrations against the war to be demon-
strations against the system that created the war" (Harman,
1980, p. 22). The need was always to link the specific issue
around which people were organizing to the wider fight against
the system, and to root that fight, not in the ballot or the terrorist
act, but in the working class's own activity.
Another aspect of the analysis of war as an inevitable prod-
uct of capitalism was the rejection of a peace strategy based
on peaceful coexistence and understanding between the major
powers, or as Kautsky called it, ultra-imperialism. Not only do
such understandings necessarily break down, as the long his-
tory of arms limitation treaties attests, but to pursue them is
typically to apologize for the crimes of the opposing imperi-
alists and militarists and to deny solidarity to those who are
fighting against them within their territories.
A second point that emerges from the classic marxist ap-
proach is the need for the concreteness in treating wars of dif-
ferent kinds and periods. From this perspective, a general theory
of war, not to mention of violence, is probably of no more
use than a general theory of holes (MacIntyre, 1978, p. 260).
The violence of the oppressor, aimed at keeping a subordi-
nate people on its knees, is not the same as the violence of
the oppressed who are struggling to get up off their knees. A
civil war fought for the abolition of slavery, or a war of na-
tional liberation, may be progressive and necessary, "despite
all the horrors, atrocities, distress and suffering that inevitably
accompany all wars," as Lenin (1950, p. 9) puts it. In contrast,
a war like World War I, which he described (1950, p. 13) as
"a war between the biggest slave-holders for the maintenance
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and consolidation of slavery," was completely reactionary on
all sides. General statements against war in principle, from this
perspective, offer neither an understanding of any particular
war nor a guide to what attitude to take toward it. "We Marx-
ists," Lenin (1950, p. 9) observed, "differ from both pacifists and
anarchists in that we deem it necessary to study each war his-
torically (from the standpoint of Marx's dialectical materialism)
and separately."
The marxist analysis that modern war is an inevitable prod-
uct of a compulsively irrational system, capitalism, points to a
strategy for avoiding nuclear holocaust, not by blurring morally
crucial distinctions between different kinds of violence, or by
symbolic protests, or by changing child-rearing practices, but
by showing that such a catastrophe "can only be avoided, in the
end, by striking the nuclear weapons out of the hands of the rul-
ing classes-by revolution" (Hallas, 1982, p. 6). In its avoidance
of abstract and ahistorical categories of explanation, involving
biological or psychological reductionism, it is clearly an advance
on previous theories of war, as well as their recent variants.
But how well could this approach guide us in the period
since World War I, and in particular in a situation of nuclear
rivalry between two superpowers, one of which called itself
socialist? Although there have been more than one hundred
wars since 1945, none has been between the advanced capitalist
powers of the West. There have, on the other hand, been wars
between "socialist" states, such as Vietnam and China, Vietnam
and Kampuchea, as well as massive military deployments on
either side of the Sino-Soviet border. The nuclear arsenals of
the major powers, furthermore, held out the prospect not of a
new redivision of the world but of its total destruction, an out-
come that could not correspond to any capitalist interest. Such
considerations led less frequently to the development of the-
ory and analysis within the marxist tradition than to alternative
accounts which identified in quite different terms the system
which gave rise to the threat of nuclear war.
Patriarchy and Violence
According to one such view, associated with a more or
less sex-segregated women's peace movement and with such
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activities as the peace camps at Greenham Common in England
and Senaca Falls in New York, war is one of many expres-
sions of a male drive to power. From this perspective, which
has gained considerable ground among social workers in recent
years, what links the threat of nuclear war to rape, wife-beating,
and destruction of the environment is a system of male domi-
nation, patriarchy. In some versions, based on a dualistic view
of human nature as comprising masculine and feminine prin-
ciples, patriarchy results from the domination of the former
(McAllister, 1982). As one "handbook for women on the nuclear
mentality" (Koen & Swaim, p. 6) puts it,
What is played out on the psychological level as domination
of the animus over the anima, and on the social level as the
domination of men over women, becomes on the political
and economic level the domination of science/technology
and capitalistic product-orientation over nature/nurture
and humanistic process-orientation .... When the intellect
and the dominating, controlling, aggressive tendencies with-
in each individual are defined as the most valuable parts of
their being and those same attributes are emphasized in the
political and economic arena, the result is a society char-
acterized by violence, by exploitation, a reverence for the
scientific as absolute, and a systematic "rape" of nature for
man's enjoyment. This result is patriarchy.
This radical feminist view assumes that women, by virtue of
their feminine "essence," are naturally peace-loving, nonviolent,
and nurturant, while men are naturally aggressive, dominating,
and misogynist (Sayers, 1982).
A variant among women peace activists, basing itself on the
psychoanalytic perspectives of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy
Chodorow, explains male violence in terms of the effects of
mother-dominated child-rearing on the psychosexual develop-
ment of male children (Dinnerstein, 1976; Chodorow, 1978).2
Boys develop their sexual identity through separation from the
mother, and develop a character structure that values objectiv-
ity, rationality, and the exploitation of nature and others. They
confirm their uncertain masculinity through aggression, com-
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petitiveness, and the hatred and domination of women and
nature.
Whether the origins of these masculine propensities lie in
an essential human nature or in specific child-rearing practices
makes a difference in terms of what role men should be encour-
aged to play in rearing children. But both views see militarism
and war as expressions of those tendencies, and in that way
linked to other forms of male dominance. They both attribute
to women a special place in the politics of peace, by virtue of
their non-violent, noncompetitive, and nurturant personalities,
and both advocate the separate organization of women in op-
position to a male system of power.
Views which employ a theory of patriarchy to identify the
systemic causes of war and its links to other forms of violence
or social injustice are, however, open to objection on empiri-
cal, theoretical, and political grounds. We briefly discuss each
in turn.
Given the division of labor in most societies, in which men
specialize in warrior functions and women in child-rearing, the
evidence for female nonviolence is surprisingly weak. Although
the family household is undeniably the setting where male dom-
inance most freely takes the form of violence against women,
and where women are most subject to physical assault, and even
though they are much more likely than men to be injured as a
result of violent incidents in the home, it does not follow that
women themselves abjure (or should abjure) violence, whether
in self-defense, retaliation, or preemptive strikes. This is also
the setting of most violence against children, and much of that
is at the hands of their mothers (Gelles & Straus, 1988; Straus;
1980; Straus & Gelles, 1986; Straus, 1983; Berk, Berk, Loseke, &
Rauma, 1983).
Outside the home men are much more involved in vio-
lence, both as perpetrators and victims. It is also true that in
wars men usually do the actual fighting and are trained to ac-
quire the necessary skills and attitudes for this function. It is
not clear that women have been less enthusiastic supporters of
war, however, whether as political heads of nations or as private
citizens. Nor, as the experience of the women's movements in
Germany, Britain, and elsewhere in World War I clearly shows,
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is it the case that even feminist women have consistently op-
posed war (Evans, 1976; Thonnessen, 1973; Mitchell, 1966; Cliff,
1984; Elshtain, 1987).
The dichotomous framework in which patriarchy theory
mirrors traditional stereotypes of masculine and feminine dis-
torts the real experience of both men and women. On the one
hand, as Johanna Brenner (1988) points out, most men have no
wish to serve in the military and do so in most cases only under
the spur of conscription or lack of civilian job opportunity. They
are even less willing to fight. "To see war as analogous to rape
does not capture its reality. Few men in battle fight in terms of
the ideology of the military or of masculinity. As Platoon shows
us, they fight terrified and miserable; the glory of battle disap-
pears quickly in the muck of war" (Brenner, 1988, p. 100). Mil-
itary discipline is sustained only with great difficulty. A recent
study of the British navy (Neale, 1985) demonstrates vividly
how crucial the press-gang, the lash, and prodigious quantities
of rum were to that institution in the days of its greatest glory.
Under fire, even sterner measures are necessary. Trotsky, for
example, built one of the great armies of modern times, as he
said, not on fear, but on the ideas of the Russian Revolution. He
was unsurpassed in his ability to inspire demoralized soldiers
(which he did by appeals, not to their masculinity, but to their
self-respect and to the cause for which they were fighting). Nev-
ertheless he considered the death penalty an indispensable part
of any army's disciplinary arsenal. So long as there are armies
and wars, he argued, "the command will always be obliged to
place the soldiers between the possible death in the front and
the inevitable one in the rear" (Trotsky, 1973, p. 411).
The psychological reasons individual men enlist may also be
very different from those implied in recruiting advertisements.
The army, after all, offers men a total environment where they
can be much more subservient, passive, and dependent than is
generally possible in civilian life. On the other hand, as Bren-
ner (1988, p. 112) argues, "The logic/emotion, abstract/concrete,
aggression/nurturance framework sentimentalizes women and
trivializes motherhood." For one thing, it ignores the rational-
ity, emotional control, and power (including the opportunities
for aggression and violence) involved in motherhood.
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Whether it looks to biology or child-rearing patterns, the-
ory that sees war as an expression of a system of patriarchy
and links it to other forms of male violence assigns an extraor-
dinary explanatory power to the male psyche. There are two
problems with this. (a) It takes for granted what needs to be
explained, why society is structured in such a way as to privi-
lege the male psyche over the female. (b) It is open to the same
kind of objection as other forms of psychological or biological
reductionism, such as explanations of war in terms of innate
human aggression, territoriality, national character, or author-
itarian personality. Such drives, instincts, traits, or personality
structures cannot explain the social institutions that give form
to them or how they change, and so leave all the important
questions unanswered.
Why does aggression, whether human or specifically male,
lead to intense soccer rivalries in one period, and world war
in another? Why does Germany appear as a land of poets and
thinkers in one century, and of authoritarian militarists in an-
other? Why does mother-dominated child-rearing, whether bi-
ologically or socially constructed, produce misogyny and male
domination in one society and rough equality of the sexes in
another (for example, the much-cited Iroquois) (Brown, 1975;
Leacock, 1981)? Such abstract and ahistorical categories are of
no use in explaining actual events or social institutions. They
cannot help us understand, for example, why World War I broke
out when it did, what objective interests were at stake, what
forces tried to prevent it and why they failed, why soldiers and
workers rebelled, why war gave way to revolution and peace
in Russia and Germany, or why the revolution succeeded in
the former case but failed in the latter. But these are surely all
questions of vital importance to an understanding of the forces
that have driven the world to war in this century and of where
the power lies to resist them.
The political strategy implied and adopted by this approach
gives priority to symbolic actions by groups of women. If the
fundamental division in society is between the sexes, and the
roots of war lie in the male psyche, then it makes sense to
try to build a peace movement of women. That is, adherents
of this perspective organize on the basis of sex, rather than
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class, and in preference to building a peace movement of both
sexes.
The best known application of this approach to the politics
of peace is the Greenham Common encampment in England, a
permanent picket of a missile site by women, many of whom
camped at the gates for months or years (Cook & Kirk, 1983).
Indeed, a small contingent remained there even after the sign-
ing of an arms agreement under which the weapons would
be destroyed (Raines, 1987). At its peak the action attracted
widespread sympathy and media attention. As a strategy for
opposing the system that threatens the world with nuclear de-
struction, it had from the beginning serious shortcomings. Not
only did it exclude men, however strong their interest in or
commitment to ending that system, but the nature of the ac-
tion was such that only women who were able and willing to
abandon their jobs, houses, and families could fully participate.
In at least one case of the author's knowledge, males among a
group of trade unionists who traveled to the camp to express
solidarity with the protesters were booed by them.
Such a strategy inevitably reduces the mass of women as
well as men to the role of passive spectators. It cannot mobi-
lize working people, men or women, in a struggle against the
system, or connect with the day-to-day struggles in which they
engage, but only substitute the actions of an heroic few for the
activity of the many in their own behalf. Not only is it unable,
therefore, to pose any serious challenge to the war machine; it
also reinforces the passivity of those on whose labor that ma-
chine's economic base depends and who, if mobilized, would
pose a threat to it. These are the objections that marxists have al-
ways raised to terrorism as a strategy (Trotsky, 1974). Although
the symbolic acts in this case involved die-ins, dancing on mis-
sile silos, and decorating the base's perimeter with baby clothes,
rather than assassinations of ministers, they were no less an ex-
pression of powerlessness and a reinforcement of passivity. In
such circumstances concern with real power to challenge the
system inevitably gives way to a preoccupation with the feel-
ing of empowerment. The personal displaces and corrupts the
political.
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Exterminism
Another, more direct, attempt to improve on the marxist
theory of imperialism and war is that of British historian E.P.
Thompson, the leading intellectual figure in the revival of the
movement against nuclear weapons in Europe and North Amer-
ica in the early 1980s. He coined the term "exterminism" to
describe the system that threatens us with a global nuclear holo-
caust, and drew the appropriate political and organizational
conclusions from his analysis (Thompson, 1980; Thompson &
Smith, 1981; Thompson, 1982).
The concept of exterminism refers to those "characteristics
of a society which thrust it in the direction whose outcome must
be the extermination of multitudes" (Thompson, 1980, p. 22). It
is seen as the consequence of "the accumulation and perfection
of the means of extermination, and of the structuring of whole
societies so that these are directed towards that end" (p. 22). The
actors and interests that sustain this thrust toward extermina-
tion are fragmented and obscure (Davis, 1982), but the picture
that emerges from Thompson's account is of two rival elites
locked in an irrational competition which neither can escape.
Whatever the origins of this situation in the rational pursuit of
their interests by particular capitalist or bureaucratic powers,
the system of competitive militarism has assumed a dynamic
of its own which is in the real interest of neither side. Culture,
politics, and economics become infected with the exterminist
cancer, and each reinforces the disease in the other. "The USA
and the USSR do not have military-industrial complexes: they
are such complexes" (Thompson, 1980, p. 23).
Although Thompson's argument is hard to pin down, it dif-
fers from the analysis of Bukharin and Lenin in at least two im-
portant respects. In the first place, Thompson, like Kautsky, sees
the drive to war, or exterminism, not as intrinsic to the capitalist
or any other mode of production, but as a kind of cancer that
infects both East and West. The whole organism is infected, both
in its physical functioning (economy) and in its thinking (ideol-
ogy), but the process may be reversible. He sees his strategy as
"initiating a counter-thrust, a logic of process leading towards
the dissolution of both blocs, the demystification of extermin-
ism's ideological mythology, and thence permitting nations in
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both Eastern and Western Europe to resume autonomy and po-
litical mobility" (Thompson, 1980, p. 30). In short, the disease
could be excised, leaving the modes of production intact. First
we need disarmament, then the "normal" processes of politics
and social change (that is, the class struggle) can resume.
A second difference between Thompson and the classical
marxist theorists of imperialism stems from this implicit "stages
theory" in which class struggle is subordinated or postponed
until the nuclear threat is eliminated. For Lenin and Bukharin,
militarism and war were class questions. Only an effective fight
against capitalism could rid the world of the horrors of impe-
rialist war; only the working class, because of its potential for
self-organization and its strategic economic location, had the
capacity to lead the struggle for peace to its necessary conclu-
sion-the revolutionary overthrow of the system that generated
war. Thompson rejects this position. Whereas the "patriarchy"
view leads toward a movement of women and the making of
links to other kinds of male violence, and the "capitalism" view
leads to the building of a revolutionary party that links the
movement for peace to the day-to-day struggles in the work-
place, the "exterminism" perspective looks to a broad move-
ment focussed on a narrow issue. It embraces both sexes and
all classes, and discourages the making of links to other issues,
especially where they might offend supporters or divide the
movement.
Thompson's essay provoked considerable discussion on the
left, not only in Britain but throughout the world. Much of
the response had already been summarized by the editors of
the New Left Review in their introductory remarks, when they
said (New Left Review, 1980, pp. 1-2): "It may be thought that
Thompson overstates the degree of symmetry between East and
West.... but he is surely right to insist that nuclear weapons,
pregnant with holocaust, cannot simply be analysed in terms
of competing class forces or social systems, but also possess
a menacing dynamic of their own." My view is the opposite.
Thompson was surely right to insist that the USSR was and
acted as an imperial power, albeit a weaker one than the United
States, and that it could not be understood simply as a victim of
Western imperialism. Indeed, the strength of Thompson's essay
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is his portrayal of a world structured by military rivalry of the
two blocs, both of them locked into a deadly competition that
takes on a life of its own and threatens the economic and polit-
ical interests, and even the survival, of both.
But Thompson was wrong to regard this as a break with the
classic theory of imperialism. As Luxemburg (1967, p. 62) wrote
in 1915, "Imperialism is not the creation of any one or of any
group of states. It is the product of a particular stage of ripeness
in the world development of capital, an innately international
condition, an indivisible whole, that is recognizable only in all
its relations, and from which no nation can hold aloof at will."
Bukharin (1972) showed how the growth of a world economy
in which there was a tendency for the competing units to be
organized into "state capitalist trusts" was inscribed in the very
logic of capitalist development. As state and economy tended
to fuse, so competition tended to assume the form of war and
the threat of war.
Two other elements of Bukharin's argument are of particular
importance in understanding the phenomena which Thompson
describes as "exterminism". The first is that the tendency to state
organization of national economies in no way overcomes the ir-
rational, compulsive, and unplanned character of capitalist com-
petition. It merely translates these features to the international
level, and thereby intensifies them and makes them more dan-
gerous (Bukharin, 1979). From this perspective, the irrationality
of "exterminism", of which Thompson makes so much, is not a
new development, but an expression of the fundamental nature
of the capitalist mode of production.
Secondly, the militarization of capitalism affects every as-
pect of society, and in particular structures the economy so
that it serves the needs of military competition. Modem war
requires a heavy industrial base to support a sophisticated mil-
itary machine-requires, in short, a "military-industrial com-
plex" that shapes the whole national economy (Bukharin, 1979).
The tendencies to state capitalism and to the militarization
of capitalist competition that Bukharin identified are especially
important because they provide the basis for an understand-
ing of how the Soviet Union fits into the picture. In its fusion
of state and economy, its organization of the whole national
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economy to meet the requirements of military competition, its
integration into a world system of competing capitals, including
state capitals, the Soviet Union carries to the farthest degree the
tendencies Bukharin saw as central to imperialism. More recent
marxists have developed the theory of state capitalism to ex-
plain the course of Russian development after the isolation of
the revolution and the disintegration of the working class as a
political force in the 1920s (Cliff, 1974; Binns, Cliff & Harman,
1987; Harman, 1984a; 1988; Haynes, 1985). It was precisely the
threat of war, they argue, that forced the pace of industrializa-
tion, dictated the concentration on heavy industry, and led to
the final consolidation of power in the hands of a state bureau-
cracy that constituted a collective capitalist class. Because of its
backwardness and its need to compete militarily with indus-
trialized rivals, the Soviet economy was organized even more,
and more ruthlessly, than that of most countries around produc-
tion of the means of destruction. In short, it was through the
medium of military competition that capitalism's compulsive
drive to accumulate reasserted itself in the Soviet Union and
reintegrated the former workers' state into the capitalist world
economy. From this perspective, the militarism of the Soviet
Union provides, not a refutation, but the strongest confirmation
of the intrinsic link between capitalism and war.
If we see that the Soviet Union and similar societies are not
fundamentally different in mode of production from the West,
then we no longer need a concept of exterminism to refer to a
dynamic that characterizes, or infects, different socioeconomic
systems but is intrinsic to none. Thompson is led to make this
unnecessary conceptual innovation by an impoverished under-
standing of imperialism on the one hand and by his view of the
Soviet Union as noncapitalist on the other. He thus fails to rec-
ognize that the very phenomena that he sees as distinguishing
exterminism-the irrational and compulsive character of the ri-
valry, the structuring of societies to ensure their capability for
mass extermination, and so on-are those which the best the-
orists of imperialism identified seven decades ago as intrinsic
to capitalism.
In short, the elements that Thompson saw as entirely new
were the very things that classic marxist theory explained. The
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further development of that theory in the direction indicated
by Bukharin's analysis, encompassing a theory of state capi-
talism and the militarization of competition, offers a coherent
framework for analyzing the underlying dynamics and forces
at work in the system that generates the threat of nuclear war.
By rooting the phenomena of "exterminism" in the structures
and contradictions of capitalism, it enables us to explain what
Thompson only describes.
The Politics of Peace
Both the Thompson strategy of a broad movement around a
single issue, and the women's peace movement that looked to a
theory of patriarchy, contained elements that appealed to social
workers. By class position as well as professional ideology they
are inclined, C. Wright Mills (1943-44, p. 171) argued in 1943, to
be limited by a "professionally trained incapacity to rise above
the level of individual cases." That assertion is too strong, as the
long history of social workers' involvement in social activism at-
tests. When social workers do "rise above" that level, it might be
more accurate to say, they are likely to do so in certain specific
ways. One of these is support for reform movements that take
up a single issue or cluster of issues. Dealing with the effects
of the larger social system as they manifest themselves in indi-
vidual lives, social workers are more likely to see discrete social
problems than the structural mechanisms that generate them.
They typically work at the "level of appearances," of what Erik
Olin Wright (1978, p. 11) calls the "immediately encountered
social experience of everyday life."
Affirming the importance of this level, Wright (1978, pp.
11-12) observes, "People starve 'at the level of appearances,'
even if that starvation is produced through a social dynamic
which is not immediately observable. The point of the dis-
tinction between appearances and underlying reality is not to
dismiss appearances, but rather to provide a basis for their
explanation .... If we remain entirely at the level of appear-
ances we might be able to describe social phenomena, and even
predict those phenomena, but we cannot explain them." Social
workers, in short, are more likely to put their efforts for so-
cial change into a famine relief campaign or even an economic
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development project than into a political strategy based on an
analysis of the dynamics of world capitalism and of the social
forces with the capacity to overthrow it. (The latter approach,
that of marxism, may of course also dictate participation in
single-issue movements, but always keeping in mind the re-
lation between the immediate struggle for reform and the rev-
olutionary goal.)
Another aspect of the way in which social workers tend
to relate the personal to the social is by moving analytically
from the individual or the small system to the larger society.
Society is seen as playing out on a bigger scale the timeless
battle of the sexes, or as reproducing the family drama at the
level of social conflict. Patriarchy theory, as we have seen, is
characterized by just this sort of psychological or biological
reductionism, and has a strong appeal to social workers be-
cause of the way it corresponds to professionally trained ways
of looking at the world. Indeed, it was anticipated in certain
respects by Jane Addams, who believed that women and men
were essentially different, and that women could, by participat-
ing in public life, further the cause of peace and social progress
through the application of their feminine qualities (Addams,
1907; Addams, 1922).
Similarly, social workers have traditionally sought to
"bridge the gap between the classes," not to heighten class
struggle (Addams, 1893). It has even been claimed that good
casework is "the only real antidote to Bolshevism" (Charity Or-
ganization Society, London, 1927, cited by Woodroofe, 1962,
p. 55). Approaches to the issue of peace and nuclear disar-
mament that ignore or deny the significance of conflicting
class interests, as both patriarchy and exterminism do, are like-
ly to be more consonant with professional perceptions and
values.
But a "natural" appeal, resulting from harmony with so-
cial workers' class position and professional ideology, does not
necessarily mean either an accurate perception or a serious strat-
egy for achieving peace. We have already examined some of
the weaknesses of the women's peace movement approach to
the politics of peace. Thompson's strategy differs, and appeals,
by virtue of its inclusiveness in relation to people and its
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narrowness in relation to issues. Let us all join together on this
one question of over-riding importance, it suggests, and leave
aside for the movement the things that divide us, such as class
or (the question raised by Boston feminists in the peace move-
ment) abortion rights (Levene & Magid, 1983).
Building a movement that will mobilize masses of people
necessarily requires a focus on the issue that brings them into
motion. At their height in the postwar period, peace movements
involved hundreds of thousands of people, and mobilized some
of the largest demonstrations in modem history. They attracted
individuals of different classes, ages, and sexes, appalled by the
horror of the nuclear threat that hangs over all humanity. They
made some gains in terms of party resolutions (in Britain) and
even of party formation (the Greens in Germany). The problem
was that they were unable to connect to a social force capa-
ble of challenging the system they saw as driving the world
toward war. That drive continued more or less unchecked as
movements grew, flourished, and declined all in the space of
a few years.
For Thompson, we have seen, nuclear disarmament was not
a class issue and not to be linked to other issues. Although nu-
clear weapons threaten members of all classes, marxist critics of
Thompson argued, some have an enormous stake in the system
which produces them, and others have the interest and capac-
ity, due to their location in the economy, to organize against
it (Harman, 1980). From a marxist perspective, "exterminism,"
the systemic tendency to nuclear holocaust, is a class issue both
because it is rooted in a class system and because people vary
by class in their will and structural capacity (Callinicos, 1987b)
for thoroughgoing opposition to that system.
This raises the question of the links that need to be made
to other aspects of the system-exploitation, poverty, unem-
ployment, national and sexual oppression-and to the possibil-
ities in a given period of making those links. In World War I
Germany, while anti-war activists outside the factories were
isolated and crushed by the military and the police, socialist
workers slowly built up a movement in the factories that linked
the struggle over wages and conditions to the war. Even then,
it took four years of work and the experience of attacks on
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living standards and union rights directly caused by the war to
build a force that could topple the government and end the war
(Miller, 1924).
The failure of the peace movements of recent decades to
mobilize a social force that could pose a serious threat to the
war system, however, was only partly a failure of their leaders
to see nuclear disarmament as a class issue. It also reflected the
distance between the immediate issues that organize workers-
fights over wages and working conditions-and the nuclear
threat. In the postwar boom of the 1950s and 1960s, real wages
grew rapidly, unemployment was low in most countries, and
the welfare state expanded even as military spending was sus-
tained at levels unprecedented in peacetime. The two aspects of
the warfare-welfare state complemented each other. (The same
considerations, of course, limited the capacity of the movement
against the Vietnam War to appeal to workers, and so to realize
the revolutionary aspirations of many of its participants.)
By the mid-seventies this was no longer the case. Economic
crisis on a world scale brought attacks on workers' living stand-
ards-on wages and the social wage. The new cold war inten-
sified the pressure on social consumption. The new weapons
systems competed directly with the welfare state and with the
wages, working conditions, and union protections of workers.
This situation presented the possibility of making the links be-
tween the different aspects of the system, generalizing from the
immediate issues that drew workers into struggle and the larger
political issue of military spending and the threat of war. How-
ever, the crisis produced, not renewed working class militancy,
but a long downturn in struggle. Strikes were fewer, longer, less
successful, and more tightly controlled by union bureaucracies.
Union membership declined as a percentage of the workforce
in some countries, notably the United States, and labor leaders
looked to public relations and other alternatives to struggle, to
rebuild declining unions (Goldfield, 1987; Moody, 1988). The
revolutionary left largely disintegrated in Europe and North
America. The exceptions to this pattern were dramatic-above
all working class upsurges in Poland and South Africa, but also
in South Korea, Brazil, and elsewhere-but the general trend
made it much harder to link the resurgent peace movement of
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the early 1980s to the working class, or even to see the need
for such a link.
Yet the need remains. For obvious reasons the future can
hold no three or four year nuclear war in which working class
opposition develops and the old regime disintegrates.
Conclusion
In contrast to the marxist theory of imperialism, which an-
alyzes the drive toward war as integral to the capitalist system,
the theories of patriarchy and exterminism shared many fea-
tures in common. Both detached the phenomena they described
from any organic or intrinsic link with capitalism. Both pointed
to the purportedly noncapitalist nature of the Soviet Union, with
its oppression of women and its subordination of every aspect
of economic and social life to militarism, as evidence of a sepa-
rate dynamic. Both posited a distinct system, coexisting with the
socioeconomic systems of East and West, with a logic of its own.
Neither credibly identified the contradictions and oppositional
tendencies that could threaten that system.
It is not clear that either perspective offered an advance
from classical marxism in any respect, despite the confidence
with which both were offered as such. Neither is able to match
marxism in offering a clear, theoretically coherent, account of
the system, the central dynamic of which produces the threat of
nuclear war as its most terrible expression. Marxism, further-
more, is able to explain the links between war and the other
issues of social justice, of oppression, hunger, and poverty, with
which social workers have traditionally been concerned, and to
show how capitalism has created the preconditions for resolv-
ing these problems, but only through its own destruction. And
it offers a strategy that goes beyond moralism and the expres-
sion of outrage, to locate the social force on which the system
depends and to which it is ultimately mostly vulnerable.
Do nuclear weapons, however, give the threat of mutual
ruin they pose to all classes, render the analysis obsolete? It
may be enough in this connection to recall the prescient words
of Rosa Luxemburg in 1915, at the beginning of the "period of
world wars." Writing from the prison cell which her revolu-
tionary opposition to World War I had earned her, she recalled
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Engels's comment that capitalism presented humanity a fateful
choice between socialism and barbarism. She wrote (1967, p. 9):
We have read and repeated these words thoughtlessly with-
out a conception of their terrible import. At this moment one
glance about us will show us what a reversion to barbarism
in capitalist society means .... The triumph of imperialism
leads to the destruction of culture, sporadically during a
modern war, and forever, if the period of world wars that
has just begun is allowed to take its damnable course to
the last ultimate consequence. Thus we stand today, as Frei-
drich Engels prophesied more than a generation ago, before
the awful proposition: Either the triumph of imperialism
and the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome,
depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery; or,
the victory of Socialism, that is, the conscious struggle of
the international proletariat against imperialism, against its
methods, against war. This is the dilemma of world his-
tory, its inevitable choice, whose scales are trembling in the
balance awaiting the decision of the proletariat. Upon it de-
pends the future of culture and humanity.
Despite the increased relevance of these words to the nu-
clear age, the analysis of imperialism developed by the great
marxists of the early twentieth century cannot simply be taken
over wholesale. As we have suggested, the rise and decline of
Stalinism, of the so-called socialist countries, as well as growth
of modern warfare-welfare states, has necessitated a develop-
ment of Bukharin's analysis of state capitalism and the world
economy (Adams, 1988; Adams, 1990; Callinicos, 1987a). The
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the consequent reduction of mili-
tary threat to Western powers, renders the classic marxist anal-
ysis in certain respects even more clearly apposite. The view
of world politics as a conflict between two rival power blocs,
one capitalist and the other anti-capitalist, is, after all, decreas-
ingly credible. Instead, we see a realignment and redivision of
a single, and increasingly integrated, capitalist world, a break-
down of the pax sovietica and pax americana that for four decades
imposed order on the world system and limited the conflicts
within it. There is a new instability in the world order-in short,
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a situation more closely resembling that which confronted the
analysis of imperialism in the years preceding World War I than
any since World War II.
On the other hand, however, there is not at present the corre-
spondence of military and economic competition that Bukharin
and others identified in the earlier period. Thus, Japan repre-
sents the main economic threat to U.S. capital but is no military
threat at all. Scientific analysis of the world system in its present
state, and of the extent to which a tendency to nuclear annihi-
lation continues to be inherent in it, is an urgent task. It cannot
simply be read off from the texts of the great theorists of imperi-
alism, but requires the same kind of historically specific inquiry
that those writers brought to their project. My argument is that
the tradition within which they worked, and which they de-
veloped, continues to offer the best hope of understanding and
transforming "the system."
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Notes
1. Socialist feminism is a variant of feminist thought which identifies two
distinct systems, patriarchy and capitalism, neither of which is explica-
ble in terms of the other. Mimi Abramovitz (1988) provides a brief but
representative exposition of this view, presenting it as an advance on
marxism. Marxists have criticized the approach as a theoretically inco-
herent attempt to square the circle (Harman, 1984b; German, 1989), to
combine two different and incompatible kinds of explanation, and two
different class positions. Socialist feminists themselves have become in-
creasingly conscious of the problems and contradictions of their position
(Hansen & Philipson, 1990; Ramazanoglu, 1989). Some have rejected patri-
archy theory in part or whole, while still attempting to straddle socialist
and feminist traditions (Rowbotham, 1989; Segal, 1987). Insofar as they
accept a version of patriarchy theory, however, and use it to explain war,
socialist feminists are open to the same objections as those raised here with
respect to feminists in general. A separate discussion of this tendency un-
fortunately cannot be pursued within the confines of this already lengthy
article. Marxism and feminism, of course, offer conflicting theories and
strategies in relation, not only to war, but also to women's oppression and
liberation. This dispute, too, is beyond the scope of the present article.
2. See also Gilligan (1982). For a representative application of these perspec-
tives to questions of war and peace, see Reardon (1985).
